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knew of the scope of the examination before it took place. Unlike or when defendant's mental condition is relevant to capital sentenc-
Buchanan, petitioner did not know the examination would involve the ing (V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1, see article this issue). In Virginia, future
issue of future dangerousness. Because this evidence was taken in dangerousness is one of the statutory aggravating factors sufficient to
deprivation of petitioner's right to assistance of counsel without a support a death sentence. At any of the aforementioned examinations,
showing of waiver of this right, the Supreme Court ruled that Smith the defendant could make statements to the mental health expert
and Satterwhite control and reversed the judgment of the Court of which could be considered relevant to the issue of future dangerous-
Criminal Appeals. ness. Left unanswered is the question, what are counsel's rights and
In Virginia, a potential problem exists because an evaluation duties upon notification?
may be performed on the issue of competency to stand trial (V.C.A.
§19.2-169.1), sanity at the time of the offense (V.C.A. §19.2-169.5), Summary and analysis by: Elizabeth A. Bennett
EVANS v. THOMPSON
881 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1989)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Petitioner Wilbert Lee Evans shot and killed Deputy Sheriff
William Truesdale while attempting to escape from state custody. In
June 1981, petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death in the Circuit Court of Alexandria, Virginia.
On March 28, 1983, Virginia enacted emergency legislation,
amending its procedures for trial by jury in capital cases to permit
capital resentencing by a newly impaneled jury where a prior death
sentence was vacated due to sentencing errors. Va. Code Ann. §19.2-
264.3(c). Previously, if the Commonwealth failed to secure a valid
death sentence due to errors in the sentencing process, it was
foreclosed from seeking capital resentencing and the defendant
received an automatic sentence of life imprisonment. Patterson v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 283 S.E.2d 212 (1981). On April 12,
1983, the Commonwealth confessed that erroneous evidence of
petitioner's prior convictions had been admitted during the sentenc-
ing phase of the trial. Petitioner's death sentence was thereafter
vacated and a new jury was impaneled for resentencing in accordance
with the new statute. After hearing evidence of petitioner's history of
violent criminal conduct, the new jury recommended that the death
penalty be imposed based upon a finding of petitioner's "future
dangerousness." In March 1984, the trial court imposed the death
penalty. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the sentence.
In May 1986, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in Alexandria Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed this
petition. The Virginia Supreme Court, as well as the United States
Supreme Court, denied review.
Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern
District of Virginia. Among other things, petitioner claimed that his
resentencing was barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause and the
protection against prosecutorial misconduct guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause. He further claimed that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The district court
rejected his petition and Evans thereafter appealed to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
HOLDING
a) Ex Post Facto Claim
Petitioner claimed that since his offense and trial occurred
before the new statute was promulgated, his resentencing should have
been barred by the holding in Patterson v. Commonwealth, supra.
Petitioner, thus alleged, under an ex post facto theory, that he was
retroactively deprived of his right to have his death sentence
converted to life imprisonment.
In holding that Petitioner was not denied any of his rights, the
Fourth Circuit explained that the rationale of the Ex Post Facto
Clause is to assure fair notice of the nature and consequences of
criminal behavior and to prevent the alteration of pre-existing rules
subsequent to the commission of an act. In order for an ex post facto
claim to be valid, the law must be retrospective and it must disadvan-
tage the offender affected by it. However, "No ex post facto
violation occurs if the change in the law is merely procedural and
does 'not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients of the
offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.' Miller v.
Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 2452-2453 (1987),
quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590,4 S. Ct. 202,210 (1884).
See also United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468, 470-471 (4th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir.
1986). The Fourth Circuit held that the new statute does no more
than change the procedures surrounding the imposition of the death
penalty. The nature and consequences of petitioner's criminal
behavior were not changed and therefore petitioner had fair warning
that the death penalty was a possible punishment and could not have
been disadvantaged by the new statute.
b) Prosecutorial Misconduct
Petitioner also argued that the state prosecutors violated his due
process rights when they knowingly proffered false conviction
records at his original sentencing hearing and then deliberately
delayed confessing error until after the 1983 statute was enacted.
Petitioner claimed that this type of prosecutorial misconduct barred
his resentencing.
The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, relying on the state
court's finding that the government acted in good faith. A state court
finding that the government acted in good faith where defendant
alleges he has been the victim of intentional or purposeful govern-
ment misconduct, is entitled to a presumption of correctness.
Sanderson v. Rice, 777 F.2d 902, 909 (4th Cir. 1985). In concluding
that the state court's findings did not lack fair support in the record,
the Fourth Circuit determined that the prosecutors were only guilty of
unintentional errors and that these errors were remedied when
petitioner received a new sentencing proceeding free of false or
misleading evidence.
c) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner further alleged that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. First, petitioner claimed that
his trial counsel improperly failed to object to the prosecution's
assertion, in his closing argument, that petitioner was a multiple
murderer. Second, petitioner argued that on direct appeal his counsel
failed to discover and inform the court that his death sentence was
based on false evidence.
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The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees all criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance
of counsel at trial and on appeal. In Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1984), the Supreme
Court announced the standard for determining whether any criminal
defendant has been effectively represented. Strickland, was a capital
case, but no higher standard was found to be required. Under
Strickland, petitioner must show that counsel's performance fell
outside the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance," Id. at
689, and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense" to
an extent "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id. at
687. Implicit in the test is a strong presumption that counsel's
performance was reasonable.
Although the trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's
erroneous assertion that petitioner was a multiple murderer, the state
habeas court had found that petitioner's counsel chose not object to
the prosecutor's argument for tactical reasons. The Fourt Circuit
held that this was a judgment which trial attorneys must make
routinely and that it did not give rise to a claim under Strickland.
Petitioner also claimed that he was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal from his 1981 conviction
because his counsel failed to discover and inform the court that his
death sentence was based on erroneous evidence of his prior
convictions. The Fourth Circuit held that petitioner failed to
overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was
reasonable. The court found that petitioner's counsel did object to
some of the records when they were introduced at trial and that some
of the erroneous convictions admitted at trial could have only been
shown by going outside the trial record. The Fourth Circuit held that
on appeal, counsel was under no duty to go beyond the trial record
because nothing beyond that record would have been cognizable on
appeal.
Further, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that on appeal counsel
does not have to raise all claims. "Following the trial, counsel
determined what he believed to be petitioner's most viable arguments
and raised them on appeal. Doing so was sound trial strategy."
Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 1989).
The court also found that petitioner failed to demonstrate he had
been prejudiced by counsel's alleged error on appeal. The Fourth
Circuit stated that petitioner could not show a "reasonable probabil-
ity" that the result of the proceeding would have been different but
for his counsel's alleged errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at
694. Rather, the court found that by vacating his original sentence
and affording him resentencing free of error, the circuit court mooted
any claims of prejudice to petitioner.
ANALYSIS
In light of the Fourth Circuit's holding that the prosecutors at the
trial stage made an unintentional error when they proffered false
conviction records at petitioner's first sentencing procedure, it is
important for trial attorneys to investigate prior conviction records
before the trial begins. If investigation into past records leads to
confusion as to the true status of a defendant's criminal record, the
trial attorney must sort out the discrepancies so that a proper
objection can be made should the prosecution try to admit false or
objectionable records. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108
S. Ct. 1981 (1988) (invalid prior conviction required setting aside
death sentence).
Second, it is clear from this opinion that the Strickland standard
of ineffective assistance of counsel is difficult to prove. The first
IAC claim was based on the trial counsel's failure to object to the
prosecution's reference to petitioner as a multiple murderer in closing
argument. The Fourth Circuit characterized this as a tactical
decision. In a non-capital case, it may be sound trial strategy to
refrain from objecting to evidence which is damaging to a client in
order to avoid highlighting that evidence again. However, in a
capital case, failure to object to every improper argument may mean
the difference between life and death to the defendant. Therefore, a
defense attorney may be obliged to violate the tradition of not
interrupting counsel during their closing argument. See case
summaries in this digest on South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct.
2207 (1989), and Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
Likewise, on appeal of a death sentence, it is necessary to
preserve every non-frivolous claim for review. The majority view, in
this case, was that counsel had followed sound trial strategy when he
determined what he believed to be the most viable arguments and
only raised those arguments on appeal. This may indeed be sound
trial strategy in a non-capital case, where counsel may choose not to
divert the attention of the appellate judges by requesting review of
every non-frivolous claim. However, in a capital case, there is no way
to determine which claims on appeal will be recognized as trial court
errors, and therefore, it is not enough to just raise the ones that appear
to be most persuasive on appeal. Dicta to the contrary in this case is
bad advice for capital defense attorneys.
Summary and analysis by: Catherine M. Hobart
